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The  United  States  and  the  Present  State 
of the  European Community 
In  a  rrorld where  radical  change ds the aider of the dey,  more  and more 
impor-tance  is being attached. by observers  on both sides of the Atlantic 
- to  relations between the United States and the  Commnnity. 
They are  separated by a vast' ocean;  they have different neighbours  and 
.. 
different  internal structures. It is understandable that they do  not 
ahrays  see  eye to  eye,  that they react differently.  But  they have  so 
MlJ.Ch  in  common,  they share  so  many  deep  convictions,  their interests 
I' 
so  often coincide,  that it is inevitable that they should  ~eek to 
establish a  true Atlantic partnership. 
Although  the  Community  has  had many  setbacks  and must  expect  to  en-
counter m2ny  more  before it reaches  its goal,  it is gradually esta-
blishing itGelf as  a  force to  be  reckoned with.  Strange  though it may 
reem,  this is how  the  Commu.nity  is seen abroad,  not  how  it is seen by 
observers  at home,  who  are perhaps  a  little impatient. 
The  Communifty is no  loneer merely the world's largest trading pol'rer 
statiscally speaking,  accounting as it does  for 40%  of world trade, 
o:ne  quarter of the merchant  vessels of the free world  and.  one quarter 
of v.10rld  i.ron  and  steel production. It has  also begun  to  make  its 
political mark. 
It m;~_s, for instance,  the first industrial power to  introduce  a  generous 
a.nd  non-discriminatory system of  generall..Ged  preferences for developing 
couJ"J.tries. It recently signed the  Lome  Convention which  affects a  more 
.... _  ... 
limited number of conntries - 46  African,  Carribbean and Pacific states 
to  be  exact  - but heralds  a  remarkably new  approach. 2. 
Not  only does  it grant duty-free  access to  99.2%  of Community  imports 
from  these countries  without  requiring reciprocal arrangements;  it also 
g1lAranteeR  the purchase of 1.4 million tons  of' sugar at  prices which  are 
virtually indexed  and  provides  a  unique  arrangement  for stabilizing the 
export  earnings of signatories whose  economies  are heavily dependent  on 
t.he  export  of one or more  raw materials. 
Considerable financial  resources have  been earmarked for a  Development 
FUnd  and new-instruments of industrial  cooperation have  been  introduced. 
It is significant that th{s  could be  accomplished at a·time when  the 
Community itself is eoine: through  a,  critical economic  phase. 
Azai.n,i.t  was  thP- Community  which  took the initiative in proposing joint 
action  b~r  inr3ustriel  and  oil producing countries to help the developing 
:  :j 
countries most affected by the  energy crisis. This tvill  t'ake  the  form  of 
emere;ency aid totallinr; ~ 3.000 million. 
fi.s  Nith  the Kennedy  Ronnel  negotiations,  the  Community  intends to do  all 
it  CP:n  to  ensure  that the multilateral  GATT  negotiations Hhich have  just 
hef,'tm  i.n  Gene1ra  are  a  success.  The  Community  regards  these neeotiations 
as  a:n  essent:i.al  a.ntidote  to  the virtually worldNide  tendency to  solve 
IJr~sent problems  by  retu:rning.to protectionist measures which can only 
aggravate matters. 
The  Community has  been  successf'ul  in assuming its international respon-
sabili  ties despite  the  fe.ct  that progress  t01"1ards  internal unity has 
hefm hesitant  a.nn  F:lo<v•  Uncertainty is, of'  course,  dogging the entire 
Co1"1rnmity  :r>c:ncl:i.ng  a  decision on the United Kingdom's  continued membership. 
B1.1t  apa,rt  f'rom  this the: sca,le  of-,,the  economic problems  which have  had to 
·~  ...  ·  ..  .;. 
·~. . be tackled. have  created considerable dis  pari  ties betvteen  the Member  States, 
reflected  in the uneven  rates of inflation t·rhich  range  from  6%  in Germany 
to  mo.,0  thc:m  2a{o  in Italy end.  the United Kingdom.  There  is a  real danger 
that these disparities will not  only lead to untold complications for.the 
agricult1lral policy- still a  basic element of integration- but also strike 
'  '  a.t  an  essential  element  of the  common  market:  free movement  of goods. 
The  Community  has  advanced  from  the  customs-union-plus-common agricultural-
policy stage to  a  point where  real  common  policies must  be defined. Since 
' 
these \·rill  obviously impinee  on  the life of every  citizen,  a  major issue 
nm-1  is whether the Community  should have  a  sounder democratic basis than 
that provided by the  interplay of its present institutions. In short,  the 
Community  is faced with  a  choice  :  it can  choose  to defend what  has  been 
:I 
e.chie"ed  so far and  prepare itself to  cope  tori th the attendant dangers  of 
losi'18' eround;  or it can  opt  for political union.  The  creation of a 
Ru:rope<'m  Conncil  in which  Heads  of Government  meet  for regular discussions 
falls far short of this ideal. True  political union calls for nothins- less 
thA.n  a.  11Europea.n  Government"  controlled by a  Parliament  elected by direct 
nniverAal  suffrage. 
The  fact that Heads  of Government  have  at lone last decided to  implement 
the Treaty in this respect  and· arrange for European elections before  1980 
(probably as  early as  1978)  augurs  well  for the future. 
The  United States should  have  a  real  interest in encouraging the rapid 
development  of a  true European  union. 
·In the present  international  climate of inequality,  hostility and uncer-
· tainty the United States needs  a  partner which,  though it may  hold different 
viel-rs  on  issues v.rhich  are of secondary importance  in the las analysis, 
.  .:;._-'  .; . 
\ sha,res  the  same  freedom,  the  same  way  of life and,  last but not least, 
the  same  economic  interests. It would  be  short-sighted of , the United 
States to  attempt  to  impose  its views  on  Europe  by  t~ting with indivi-
dual  members  rather than the Community  as  a  whole.  Indeed recourse to 
bilateralism could  be  dangerous:  it could flatter certain European  leaders 
'  I 
and  reinforce nationalist ideas  and  vain illusions of autonomy.  Any short-
lived or minor  adavantages  gained in this way  would  have  to be l-reighed 
aeainst the damage  done  to the  cause of European unity.  Short  cuts  are not 
always  the quickest  and  s~fest of routes. 
It is here that the leadership of the United States, within the Atlantic 
partnership,  can  show  its far-sightedness  and its long-term sense of res-
4 
ponsability as  it did in the pas  when  it made  Marshall  Aid  conditional on  cl 
cooperation between Europeans. It would  then be for ~pe  to develop into 
'  ! 
a  partner worthy of this  confic'l.ence. 
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